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Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. Krueger
Over the past few years, the word “globalization” has increasingly been
used to characterize the “new international economy.” The term seems to
imply a quantum leap from an earlier state of relative isolation of countries
to a current situation in which all economic activities are very sensitive to
events in distant corners of the world. In some regards, that implication is
misleading: Increasing interdependence has been an ongoing phenomenon
over many centuries as transport costs have fallen, communications links
have improved, and times necessary to cover distances have diminished.
In one fundamental regard, however, things have altered dramatically in
the very recent past.
That regard is the ﬂows of private capital between nations. After the
collapse of the international economy in the 1930s, the architects of the
Bretton Woods system presumed that private international capital ﬂows
would never again be signiﬁcant, and they built their postwar architec-
ture (of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) on that
premise.
That premise was largely valid during the 1950s and 1960s, and most
capital ﬂows in that era were from oﬃcial origins to governments in receiv-
ing countries. By the late 1960s, however, private capital ﬂows (in addition
to short-term trade credits) had resumed in signiﬁcant proportions be-
tween the United States and Western Europe. By the 1970s, private capital
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1ﬂows from industrial countries to a select group of newly industrializing
countries were beginning to increase. As late as the early 1980s, however,
it was widely assumed that oﬃcial capital ﬂows would continue to be the
main source of longer-term ﬁnancing between industrial and developing
countries.
All that changed in the 1990s, however, as the ﬂow of private capital
burgeoned. It is estimated that net private capital ﬂows to emerging mar-
kets rose from US$47.7 billion in 1990 (equal to 0.8 percent of their GDP)
to a peak of $212 billion, or 3.0 percent of their GDP) only six years later
in 1996 (International Monetary Fund [IMF] 1999, table 3.1). In a real
sense, the magnitude of capital ﬂows has increased so dramatically, there
is no question but that there has been a major change in the economic envi-
ronment.
The very magnitude of these ﬂows raises important questions as to their
eﬀects. Issues arise concerning the diﬀerential impact of diﬀerent types
of private capital ﬂows—bank lending, bonds, portfolio investment, and
foreign direct investment. Questions also have been put regarding the spill-
over eﬀects, if any, from various types of capital inﬂow to the domestic
economy in terms of technology transfer, learning by doing, and compe-
tition.
The fact that large-scale ﬂows are of such recent origin implies that we
know much less than we would like to regarding their eﬀects. To contribute
to our increasing understanding of these ﬂows, the National Bureau of
Economic Research–East Asia Seminar in Economics (NBER-EASE)
agenda has, for the past two years, been focused on aspects of capital
ﬂows. At the ninth annual seminar, analysts assessed the microeconomic
impacts of some capital ﬂows originating in, or destined for, the various
countries of East Asia. At the tenth annual seminar, focus was on the mac-
roeconomic aspects of these ﬂows.
Understanding the determinants and consequences of private capital
ﬂows is important for its own sake at any time. But in light of the ﬁnancial
crises taking place in Asia and other countries over the past several years,
where the behavior of private capital ﬂows was deemed by most to be an
important part of the story of crises, understanding the macroeconomic
impact of capital ﬂows and their behavior has become a central concern
of policy makers everywhere.
Many questions arise. Private capital ﬂows rose sharply prior to the cri-
sis in most crisis-aﬀected countries. They then reversed abruptly, as inves-
tors sought to get their money out. These reversals in themselves consti-
tuted huge macroeconomic shocks: In the Asian crisis-aﬀected countries,
net private capital inﬂows constituted 6.3 percent of GDP in 1995, and 5.8
percent of GDP in 1996. They then abruptly reversed (after being positive
in the ﬁrst half of 1997) to a negative 2.0 percent of GDP in 1997 and 5.2
2 Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. Kruegerpercent of GDP in 1998—a swing of more than 10 percent of GDP in a
very short span of time.
Why did capital inﬂows rise and then fall so sharply? And why did the
crises happen in such rapid succession in 1997? What determined the tim-
ing of the ﬁrst (Thai) crisis? Why did the crisis spread to neighboring coun-
tries? And why were some economies hard hit into crisis while others (such
as Taiwan) were able to weather their diﬃculties with much less strain and
no crisis? As economists have debated this question, two broad schools
of thought have emerged. On one hand, there are those who believe that
economic fundamentals (the exchange rate regime, the rate of domestic
credit expansion, or other key policy parameters) were at fault in the crisis-
aﬀected countries. On the other hand, there are those who believe that
investors are, at least to a degree, irrational, subject to “herd behavior” or
otherwise changing behavior sharply in response to events little related to
underlying economic prospects.
A second set of questions arises as to the diﬀerences between the 1990s
crises and earlier, balance-of-payments crises, experienced by many devel-
oping countries. At a superﬁcial level, the diﬀerence is obvious: In earlier
years, balance-of-payments crises took place in countries with little or no
capital mobility and largely inconvertible currencies. In the 1990s, by con-
trast, the fact that there was substantial capital mobility meant that capital
ﬂows were a major part of the payments crisis. Yet in fact, a second—
perhaps even more important—diﬀerence resulted from capital mobil-
ity. That is, a change in the exchange rate (a universal part of the policy
response to crisis) not only aﬀected importers and exporters and their
proﬁtability contrasted with the producers of nontradable goods (such as
wholesale and retail trade, construction, and domestic transportation), it
also aﬀected the balance sheets of the banks. Once banks (or major bor-
rowers from the foreign banks) had liabilities denominated in foreign ex-
change, a change in the exchange rate almost inevitably meant that banks’
liabilities rose more than their assets. Under these circumstances, when
banking and ﬁnancial systems were already weak, as was the case in many
of the crisis-aﬄicted countries, the fact that there had to be a sizable
change in the nominal exchange rate implied that the ﬁnancial sector of
the economy was greatly weakened.
The consequence was the “ﬁnancial crises” of the 1990s. These crises
combined the old-fashioned balance-of-payments crisis with new diﬃcul-
ties associated with a weakened ﬁnancial system. Worse yet, recovery from
crisis could not really begin until the banking system and ﬁnancial sector
were recapitalized, which in turn often required restructuring of the bal-
ance sheets of domestic producers. Any ﬁnancial crisis—such as those in
the United States (S&L crisis) in the late 1980s, in Sweden in 1992, and in
Japan in 1997—creates major diﬃculties and challenges for policy makers;
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two, however, makes the crisis manyfold more diﬃcult to resolve than were
each to be faced alone.
In addition to questions concerning the role played by key policy vari-
ables in crisis, and the “rationality” of capital ﬂows, the timing of the
Asian crises raised another, related, question: that is, whether crises are
contagious. Contagion itself could be rational or irrational: It could be
rational if the onset of one crisis serves as a “signal” to market participants
who cannot otherwise coordinate that a successful attack on another cur-
rency (where fundamentals are weakening but where any one individual
getting out of the currency is likely to lose) is now possible; it would be
irrational if market participants choose to get out of other countries (with-
out regard to their fundamentals) once one country experiences a crisis.
One way or another, all of the papers in this volume address issues perti-
nent to understanding the macroeconomic dimensions of capital ﬂows, the
origins of the 1990s-style crises, the linkages between the foreign exchange
variables and the ﬁnancial variables, and the key questions associated with
eﬀorts to solve the crises.
The ﬁrst several papers cover macroeconomic aspects of capital ﬂows
that are relevant for understanding the causes of crisis. The ﬁrst paper,
by Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (CPR), directly addresses the relative
importance of ﬁnancial fragility and external imbalances in the Asian ﬁ-
nancial crises. In their view, weak fundamentals explain why countries
went into a crisis. They contribute to rapidly growing literature on this
subject by using “cross-variables.” CPR thus ﬁnd that large current-
account deﬁcits signiﬁcantly increase the probability of a crisis when a
country’s reserves are low (but do not do so when they are high). They
likewise ﬁnd that real exchange rate appreciation, associated with large
current-account deﬁcits, is a signiﬁcant fundamental. Even more signiﬁ-
cantly, their results suggest that neither current account deﬁcits nor ﬁnan-
cial fragility alone seem to cause a ﬁnancial crisis, but that the presence
of a large current-account deﬁcit combined with ﬁnancial fragility does.
Measures of ﬁnancial fragility, including the extent of nonperforming
loans in the banking system prior to the crisis, and the estimated magni-
tude of the costs of restoring the banks to solvency are all statistically
signiﬁcant. As Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini note, however, “Per se, these
results cannot discriminate across alternative explanations of currency cri-
ses based on self-fulﬁlling speculative attacks, as opposed to fundamental
factors. They do, however, identify a set of variables that appear to en-
hance the vulnerability of an economy to a crisis.”
In the second paper, Aaron Tornell also examines the linkages between
currency and ﬁnancial crises, and then examines the similarities between
the Asian crises of 1997 to the “tequila” crisis in Mexico at the end of
1994. Tornell starts by noting that there are two issues: On one hand, there
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there is a question as to the timing of the crisis. He recognizes that fore-
casting the timing of any crisis is diﬃcult, but seeks to ask whether, once
there is a crisis somewhere, fundamentals determine which countries are
aﬀected.
He ﬁnds that countries with “sound fundamentals” (real exchange rates
that have not appreciated, the strength of the banking system, and the
liquidity of the central bank) are not likely to be vulnerable to crises even
when one occurs somewhere else in the world. However, countries whose
fundamentals are weaker are vulnerable to crisis, in the sense that if one
country is in crisis, the other countries will be attacked if investors turn
pessimistic (as they may after a crisis has occurred in one country). Tornell
notes that this conclusion implies that, once fundamentals are weak, the
risk of crisis is linked to investors’ expectations. To the extent that those
expectations shift abruptly, countries may experience crisis. Insofar as in-
vestors’ expectations cannot be explained, the timing of crises cannot be
explained.
Two papers examine the role of bank lending in contagion. In the ﬁrst,
Kaminsky and Reinhart calculate the conditional and unconditional prob-
abilities of crisis based on the usual economic variables but including the
existence of crisis elsewhere. They conclude that contagion is more regional
than global; i.e., that if an Asian country experiences a crisis, other Asian
countries are more likely to be attacked than Latin American countries.
They also conclude that susceptibility to contagion increases rapidly as
more countries go into crisis: If only one country has a crisis, the likelihood
of contagion is reasonably small; if two countries are in crisis, however,
the odds of contagion increase dramatically. Kaminsky and Reinhart also
examined the extent to which trade ties and ﬁnancial ties between a crisis
country and other countries aﬀected the likelihood of crisis in the other
countries. They found that close ﬁnancial ties are more likely to result in
contagion than close trade ties. This was the case with Argentina and Mex-
ico, where trade links are very small while ﬁnancial links are signiﬁcant,
and between Thailand and Indonesia, where the same pattern prevails.
In his paper, Shin-ichi Fukuda attempts to understand the behavior and
role of banks and bank lending in the crisis. He develops a model of asym-
metric information, in which borrowers know whether they are credit-
worthy but lenders cannot distinguish between them until there is some
diﬀerence in their behavior. Lenders can lend for either one or two periods,
and bank monitoring can reveal the creditworthy borrowers after one pe-
riod. In Fukuda’s model, creditworthy borrowers seek to reveal their own
type, while other borrowers attempt to conceal theirs. The result, in the
model, is that there is a trade-oﬀ:E ﬀorts to borrow short-term on the part
of creditworthy borrowers, and monitoring of loans by banks, can increase
the eﬃciency of the ﬁnancial system. However, there is also a risk of liquid-
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the likelihood of signiﬁcant costs associated with periods of illiquidity. As
Fukuda recognizes, his model provides one step in understanding bank
behavior and the possibility that there can be more than one equilibrium
position (and therefore that there can be a rapid shift between good and
bad states).
The next two papers examine various aspects of exchange rate behavior
as they related to the crises. It was already seen that both Corsetti, Pesenti,
and Roubini and Tornell found that vulnerability to crisis was increased
with an appreciating real exchange rate and a widening current account
deﬁcit. This calls into question the role of the exchange rate regime in
making countries vulnerable to crisis. Certainly, the Asian and Tequila
crises came about after a substantial period during which the exchange
rate regime had had a de facto dollar peg, at least implicitly. On one hand,
the dollar peg made the currency more overvalued as the yen depreciated
relative to the dollar; on the other hand, for countries whose rate of inﬂa-
tion was above that of the United States and Japan, there was real appreci-
ation on that account.
Moreover, the dollar peg system seemed to reduce currency risk for in-
vestors, and thus attracted large capital inﬂows. These inﬂows in turn re-
sulted in “overheating” of the Asian economies or a large accumulation of
short-term liabilities which made the countries vulnerable for a crash. A
central question is whether an alternative currency regime would have
made the Asian economies less vulnerable to crisis.1
The ﬁrst of the papers that bear on this issue is by Ogawa and Sun. They
ﬁrst used actual data to estimate regression equations with instrumental
variables such as the interest rate, the exchange rate, the rate of export
growth, and the rate of change in stock prices to estimate capital ﬂows.
They then developed a simulation model to estimate what would have hap-
pened under alternative exchange rate regimes in which exchange rates
moved as a weighted average of the yen and dollar rates (i.e., had adopted
a currency basket peg). According to their model, capital inﬂows into
Thailand and Korea would have been signiﬁcantly reduced in the period
from 1986 to 1997 under the currency basket, and those to Indonesia
would have declined somewhat. Interestingly, although both Japanese in-
vestors (in yen) and American investors (in dollars) are sensitive to ex-
change rate swings, American investors appear to respond more strongly,
so that in the period when the dollar was constant in nominal terms, for-
eign investment was attracted to a greater extent than it would have been
under a currency basket system. Ogawa and Sun conclude by noting that,
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1. There is a growing consensus among the policy making community that the only defen-
sible exchange rate regimes are ﬂoating or dollarization. There is, however, less empirical
evidence to support this conclusion than would be desirable, and the papers in this volume
represent signiﬁcant progress in providing empirical support for that proposition.although the exchange rate regime was a factor inducing large capital in-
ﬂows, other factors (such as deregulation of capital ﬂows) may also have
contributed, and that further research is called for to estimate the impor-
tance of these factors in surges of capital inﬂows.
The second paper is by Takagi and Esaka, who investigate how mone-
tary authorities responded to large and rapidly increasing capital inﬂows.
They note that foreign direct investment constituted about half of the East
Asian capital inﬂows in the 1980s, but that by the 1990s, short-term bor-
rowing by banks and corporations was the bulk of capital inﬂows in most
countries (Malaysia was an exception) and were, as already noted, very
large. While there are signiﬁcant beneﬁts to capital inﬂows, they can im-
pose costs because rapid monetary expansion, inﬂationary pressures, real
exchange rate appreciation, and widening current account deﬁcits can re-
sult. And, of course, large outstanding indebtedness increases vulnerability
to capital outﬂows.
Takagi and Esaka question the extent to which monetary management
in the capital-receiving countries was appropriate. They note that oﬃcial
foreign exchange reserves rose signiﬁcantly during the period of capital
inﬂow, indicating that the current account deﬁcits were smaller than the
capital inﬂows by about a third. This means that there was sterilization of
capital inﬂows, which in turn implies that monetary policy was tighter, and
interest rates higher, than they otherwise would have been. That, in turn,
was undoubtedly a factor in increasing the size of the inﬂows, contrasted
with what they would have been at lower interest rates. Takagi and Esaka
then estimate a quarterly model for determinants of monetary aggregates.
They conclude that capital inﬂows into the Asian countries were signiﬁ-
cantly larger than they would have been in the absence of sterilization.
One economy that escaped the crisis was that of Hong Kong, although
the currency was attacked during the summer of 1998. Hong Kong has
had a currency board under which there is no independent monetary pol-
icy and the exchange rate is rigidly ﬁxed. Since the Asian crisis, many
observers—noting the diﬃculties associated with the ﬁxed nominal ex-
change rate, or dollar peg, system—have advocated currency boards. In
their paper, Kwan, Lui, and Cheng analyze how the currency board system
in Hong Kong functioned. They start by examining the policies used by
the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), which started with a pe-
riod during which it operated according to set rules. It then switched to a
regime in which it used more discretion. Now, ﬁnally, it has switched back
to a rules-based regime.
In their paper, Kwan, Lui, and Cheng provide a valuable history of the
operations of the HKMA and, in addition, attempt to measure the credi-
bility of the system in each of the periods, using methods developed in the
target zone literature. They ﬁnd that the HKMA was far more credible in
the period during which it followed rules than when there was more discre-
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of the Asian crisis contributed to the erosion of market conﬁdence and
made a speculative attack on the currency more likely. While results for
Hong Kong would not necessarily hold for other countries if they were
to adopt currency boards, the paper provides valuable insights into the
functioning of the Hong Kong board.
One of the issues arising out of the ﬁnancial crisis has been diﬀerences
in types of capital ﬂows. As suggested by the Fukuda model (and in much
other work), many analysts have been suspicious of bank lending—es-
pecially short-term bank lending—as making countries much more vul-
nerable to crisis than they would be if capital inﬂows were more heavily
weighted toward foreign direct investment (FDI), long-term bonds, and
equity investments. Three papers at the conference addressed aspects of
these issues. Many policy makers and analysts have argued that FDI and
equity investments are much less susceptible to sudden departures in times
of crisis, and thus are much less volatile than short-term capital ﬂows and
especially bank lending.
In his paper, Fukao analyzes the behavior of manufacturing subsidiaries
of Japanese companies located in Asia, in an attempt to ascertain how
these ﬁrms (which were presumably either established by the parent com-
pany through FDI or acquired through equity investment) behaved during
the crisis. He ﬁnds that, in the months following the Asian crisis, Japanese
subsidiaries did not reduce employment, although they did not undertake
any further new investments. The greater the proﬁtability of the parent
company, the greater the likelihood that a subsidiary would maintain em-
ployment, suggesting that subsidiaries receive support from their overseas
owners during periods of crisis, which may oﬀset part of the impact of the
crisis on the economy in which the subsidiary operates. Fukao also found
that subsidiaries with strong export positions were able to fare quite well
after crises, especially contrasted with subsidiaries whose sales were di-
rected largely toward domestic markets. These latter experienced much
more diﬃculty than their trade-oriented counterparts.
In their paper, Razin, Sadka, and Yuen (RSY) raise some questions
about the relative superiority of FDI. They note that FDI has two types
of eﬀects. It is beneﬁcial in that it can promote technology transfer, permit
the importation of new intermediate goods, and lead to more competition.
RSY also point to the stability of FDI in times of ﬁnancial crisis, and note
that FDI may constitute the only remaining link between domestic and
international capital markets in times of crisis. However, if there are asym-
metric information issues resulting from FDI, those eﬀects can—in their
model—result in underperformance of the domestic equity market and
thus oﬀset part or all of the beneﬁts of FDI.
In their model, this result comes about because FDI combines foreign
and domestic savings, and gives managerial control and inside information
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vested). With their inside information, foreigners keep equity in ﬁrms with
good prospects but sell oﬀ equity in ﬁrms that are likely to be less proﬁt-
able. Domestic residents do not have insider information, but because of
adverse selection their average returns on investment are smaller than they
would be if they could choose across the entire range of ﬁrms. RSY then
proceed to develop a simulation model to attempt to quantify the relative
magnitude of the beneﬁcial and the distorting eﬀects of FDI. They ﬁnd
that, for plausible values of the parameters, it is possible that the adverse
selection problem may dominate.
In addition to the types of evidence brought to bear on capital ﬂows in
the papers already discussed, issues arise with respect to individual coun-
tries. In many ways, South Korea’s crisis was the most surprising of them
all: The country had had an outstanding record of economic growth and
rising living standard continuously since 1960. Exports had grown from
miniscule levels to make South Korea one of the leading exporters in the
world; savings rates had risen; the government budget had been balanced;
and inﬂation had been tamed.
With that enviable track record, researchers have focused a great deal
of eﬀort on analyzing the Korean experience. The ﬁnal paper in the volume
examines capital inﬂows and their role in the crisis from the perspective
of the Korean economy. Dongchul Cho and Kiseok Hong try to assess
the relative importance of internal factors as contrasted with the external
environment (and especially the crisis that had already engulfed Indone-
sia, Malaysia, and Thailand) in triggering the crisis in South Korea. Cho
and Hong examine the various factors that are regarded as important in
the fundamentals and in contagion. They conclude that the crises in other
countries weakened the Korean economy, but that they alone could not
have caused the crisis. Instead, Cho and Hong believe, Korean economic
policies, especially in the ﬁnancial sector, were weaker than was generally
perceived. Moreover, they assert that Korean investors believed that the
government would bail out the chaebol, and continued acting on that belief
until the crisis came. Foreigners, by contrast, were more skeptical that a
bailout was certain, and hence were the ones who tried to get out of won
and Korean investments ﬁrst. When the ﬁrst signs of imminent trouble
appeared, policy responses were inappropriate and made the onset of the
crisis. Cho and Hong thus see the Korean crisis as based on fundamentals,
but made worse by contagion eﬀects and policy mistakes in initial eﬀorts
to cope with it.
There is, of course, a great deal more to be learned about the interaction
between foreign exchange and ﬁnancial markets in crises, about the timing
of crises, about the degree to which contagion can make even countries
with sound policies vulnerable, and about the most promising policy ap-
proaches to mitigating crises. Yet despite the diﬀerences in emphasis across
Introduction 9these papers, the reader will recognize a strong consensus on a number of
things: the importance of fundamental economic policies, the role of ﬁ-
nancial and exchange-regime weaknesses in contributing to crisis, and the
role of diﬀerent types of capital ﬂows in contributing to them. It is doubt-
ful whether analysis can yield suﬃciently conclusive results that crises can
be a thing of the past. Lessons learned and research results such as these,
however, can make future crises less severe when they do happen, and can
make their onset less likely.
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